The task was to bring the two qualities together, to unify human beings with themselves, but inside the social state. Rousseau achieved this by basing the social contract on his novel notion of freedom as self-legislation, the human ability to follow laws of humanity's own making. People who lived under such self-imposed laws would recover the wholeness of their original natural lives, but only at the cost of repressing every expression of the personal interest that was revealed as their second nature within existing society.
Thus political society had to put itself on a new basis by at once fulfilling nature and repressing it; it had to impose on men the unity they had willingly given up, return them to nature by denaturing them. The contradictions in these ideas are inescapable because they correspond to those of human nature, forever divided between animality and liberty. Fs XIa Rousseau achieved just what liberalism had previously found impossible: justifying sovereignty on the basis of bare individual nature by his novel attribution to individuals of an innate capacity for self-legislative freedom.
But the result was to make the earlier liberal notion of freedom as security pale beside this much more vital and powerful idea of autonomy. The cost of finding an innate end or good within the pure individuality on which liberalism had sought to construct a politics of neutrality was to release in society the demand that autonomy replace the narrow liberty of liberalism, and this meant a call for revolution. Modern politics can recover a unified purpose only by revolutionizing itself, by imposing from above, but in the name of society, the unity that can free human nature from itself.
Fs notabene. Where do we begin? This might be called the era of "absolute" or "national" monarchies. It is the notion of sovereignty that gives form to the latter. As it prevailed in Europe, this notion was radically new in history. To understand it, we have to understand the world from which it emerged and the world it then reorganized. Fs 3b What were the political forms at men's disposal after this event? But they were present in men's consciousness as significant, and perhaps desirable, political possibilities. Fs 3c The first form was obviously the empire, which had collapsed in the West but remained in the East.
It is impossible to overemphasize just how powerful the idea of empire was in men's minds, even long after the Roman Empire had fallen. Every king wanted to be "emperor in his kingdom. Even today people still speak of the idea of the "World State. It is the bringing together of all the known world, of the orbis terrarum, under a unique power. The idea of empire does not refer primarily to the conquering zeal of a few individuals Alexander, Caesar, Charlemagne, or Napoleon.
It corresponds instead to men's unity, to the universality of human nature, which wants to be recognized and addressed by a unique power. It is a natural political idea. Fs notabene 3d The city-state was the other significant model. A city-state is potentially present from the moment a sufficient number of men are assembled in one place. Like the empire, this type of political organization enjoyed great prestige, a reflection of the Roman Republic's glory and also, through Rome, of the glory of Athens and Sparta.
This prestige remained considerable in Europe wherever certain city-states reached a high degree of political power, economic prosperity, or intellectual eminence: the Hanseatic towns, Venice, or Florence for example. In decline after the monarchies' triumph, it returned to nourish hopes for a new civic life, for "freedom" though within a national framework, which changed profoundly the original idea.
The idea of the city-state implies a public space where citizens deliberate on everything concerning their "common affairs. It is an eminently natural political idea. Fs 4a The most striking fact about Europe's history is that neither the city-state nor the empire, nor a combination of the two, provided the form under which Europe reconstituted its political organization. Instead, monarchy was invented. To be sure, the Church cannot be placed on the same plane as the empire and the city-state.
But by its very existence and distinctive vocation, it posed an immense political problem to the European peoples. This point must be stressed: the political development of Europe is understandable only as the history of answers to problems posed by the Church, which was a human association of a completely new kind.
Each institutional response created in its turn new problems and called for the invention of new responses. The key to European development is what might be called, in scholarly terms, the theologico-political problem. Fs notabene 4c The Church posed two problems to the European peoples, one circumstantial, the other structural.
The circumstantial problem is well known: in the general disintegration following the barbarian invasions, the Church had to take on social and political functions not carried out by civil authorities. Thus an "unnatural" amalgam of secular functions and specifically religious ones was formed. The structural problem is also well known, but it is important to formulate it precisely.
Fs 4d The definition that the Church gave itself embodied a contradiction. On the other hand, it had been assigned by God himself and by his Son the mission of leading men to salvation, for which the Church, by God's grace, was the unique vehicle. Consequently it had a right or duty to oversee everything that could place this salvation in peril. But since all human actions were faced with the alternative of good and evil except those actions considered "immaterial" , the Church had a duty to oversee all human actions. And among human actions, the most important were those carried out by rulers.
The definition of this potestas varied considerably, depending on whether it was conceived of as directa or indirecta, but the political impact of its claim remained essentially the same. This claim reached its full extent with the Gregorian reform at the end of the eleventh century. At that time the ecclesia Christiana was considered the only true respublica. Fs notabene 5a The remarkable contradiction embedded in the Catholic Church's doctrine can be summarized in this way: although the Church leaves men free to organize themselves within the temporal sphere as they see fit, it simultaneously tends to impose a theocracy on them.
It brings a religious constraint of a previously unheard of scope, and at the same time offers the emancipation of secular life. Unlike Judaism and Islam, the Church does not provide a law that is supposed to govern concretely all of men's actions in the earthly city. Fs 5b It might be objected that the Church of the Middle Ages always aimed at theocracy and not at the liberation of secular space.
There is something to this objection. However, we must consider not only what the Church did directly, but also what it made possible through the contradiction I have indicated. By this very fact, it acknowledged that it did not wish to impose a particular political regime. Consequently, when the secular world later regained its strength, it had the latitude to seek the political form that could best resist the Church's claims. In other words, the struggle against the Church's theocratic side was made possible and in a sense authorized by the side that declared Caesar's domain to be free.
Imperium besetzt von Kirche ; europ. Monarchie: statische - dynamische Seite. Kurzinhalt: [A]bsolute or national monarchy Because of these three features, monarchy was much more compatible with the Church than Textausschnitt: 5c On what political bases, then, did the secular world tend to organize itself in order to confront the Church's claims? Let us examine the resources of the two available political forms we have mentioned. Fs 5d First, the city-state. Up to the sixteenth century, city-states were prevalent in certain regions of Europe Northern Italy, Flanders, Northern Germany.
The historical reasons for this do not concern us here. What is striking is that this political form was overcome by a kind of incapacity to expand or even to endure. This fact stems, of course, from the instability specific to this form of political organization. Civil strife between factions often led to the paralysis and even self-destruction of the city-state, as the chronicles of the Greek and Italian city-states eloquently attest. To these natural reasons were added reasons related to the presence and influence of the Church.
On this point two apparently contradictory remarks must be made. On the one hand, when facing the Church, the city-states were relatively weak; they found it difficult to stand up to it. On the other, they were very unfriendly to the Church, which returned the compliment. Fs 6a City-states were ideologically weak: they were "particulars" facing two "universals," the Empire and the Church. Each faction within the European city-state tended to rely on the support of one of these universals Guelphs and Ghibellines in Florence or to rely also on some foreign monarchy.
Furthermore, the city-states had an extremely intense, indeed tumultuous, political life. The interests and passions of its citizens were naturally turned toward worldly matters. The city-state thus tended to constitute an especially closed world, one especially resistant to the Church's influence. Finally, the natural position of its citizens was to assert their independence.
On these three points, monarchy presented altogether different characteristics. Fs 6b Too inimical structurally to the Church's claims, the city-state was at the same time too weak to set up a political form capable of successfully asserting itself against the Church while acceding to certain of its demands. Florence is a good example. Perhaps it will be objected that an atypical situation prevailed in Italy, since there the pope was a temporal prince.
In reality, even in Italy, the Church's strength was essentially spiritual. The pope was never actually able to carry on a war alone; at the time of the papacy's greatest prestige, he was unable to command adequate obedience even in Rome. Indeed, before the Reformation, he had more influence in England or Germany than in Italy. Fs 6c In any case, this situation of the Italian city-states had major consequences for all of European history.
The mixture of structural hostility and intrinsic weakness in the city-state's relationship with the Church explains to a large extent why Italian city-states developed, and with such aggressiveness, the first truly secular civilization in the Christian world. The great literary assertions of the solidity, independence, and nobility of the secular world were born in Italy: those of Dante, Marsilius of Padua, Boccaccio. This Florentine tradition was then taken up, radically transformed, and made operational for the offensive against the Church launched by that great enemy of Christianity, Machiavelli.
Fs notabene 6d As for the Empire, its actual performance as distinguished from the prestige of its idea , was in a sense even more modest than that of the city-state. It was not for lack of geniuses: it suffices to mention Charlemagne or Frederick II. Besides, the intrinsic difficulty of the imperial venture in an area as geographically, ethnically, and politically divided as Europe has to be taken into account. Of course, the Eastern Empire in Constantinople did coexist in a potentially organic union with Christianity.
But this union was realized in Constantinople, far from the radiating center of the Christian presence, the pope. Joseph de Maistre, who is particularly reliable on this subject, maintains that if the seat of the Empire was transferred to Constantinople, it was an instinctively opportune impulse: Constantine sensed that "the emperor and the pontiff could not be contained within the same enclosure.
We know that this political form was absolute or national monarchy. Before trying to describe the spiritual and political changes that made its constitution possible, I should like to say briefly why it was structurally superior to the city-state and the Empire when confronting the problem posed by the Church's claims.
Fs notabene 7b Like the emperor, and unlike the city-state, the king was able to lay claim to "divine right" in accordance with the Pauline axiom: "All power comes from God. Moreover, political life in a kingdom was much more modest than in a city-state, leaving men freer to dedicate themselves to matters of the other world.
Finally, the natural position of a monarch's subjects was one of obedience, which suited the Church better. Because of these three features, monarchy was much more compatible with the Church than was the city-state. Simultaneously, and paradoxically, with the assertion of divine right the secular king was in principle radically independent from the Church: the king depended directly on God.
The practical consequence was that kings tended to place themselves at the head of even the religious organizations of their kingdoms. Fs 7c The historical fortune of monarchy in the Christian world stems in large part from the fact that this political form permitted a broad acceptance of the Church's presence and, at the same time, possessed an extremely powerful force the monarch by divine right for guaranteeing the political body's independence from the Church.
Fs 7d Thus European monarchy had two sides. The first, a "static" one, can be described as the union of throne and altar. The king was a good Christian and submissive son of the Church, and the Church recognized him as king by God's grace and preached obedience to his power. The second was "dynamic": the king tended naturally to assert the political body's total independence from the Church and hence to claim even the religious sovereignty of his kingdom for example, the nomination of bishops, control of religious orders, and even, in extreme cases such as England, participation in the definition of Christianity's dogmatic content.
Whereas in the Middle Ages political bodies were enveloped or incorporated by the Church, every monarchy heading toward absolutism tended to incorporate the Church within its borders. The kingdom became the supreme political body, the human association par excellence. Once this supremacy was permanently established, the kingdom became the "nation," and its "representatives" imposed on the clergy the "civil constitution," establishing the Church's complete subordination to the body politic. Fs notabene 8a Thus monarchy appeared to be less a regime than a process. This explains why the great historical theories formulated in the nineteenth century readily took away its specificity, making it into a simple instrument destined to be thrown on the scrap heap once it accomplished what "history" expected from it.
For Marxism, it was the instrument for passing from "feudalism" to "capitalism"; for Guizot, the instrument of "national" unification and "civilization"; for Tocqueville, it made possible the passage from "aristocracy" to "democracy. Monarchy broke the natural rhythm of political history in Europe, and only in Europe. Monarchie vs. Politik ;. Textausschnitt: 8b The natural rhythm of a body politic can be roughly described as follows. In foreign policy, it fosters territorial expansion up to the point that this expansion threatens its defeat. In domestic policy it involves either conservatism, leading to the petrification of the regime, or a displacement traditionally described as "cyclical" among political forms, predetermined and constant in their essential characteristics: aristocracy, democracy, anarchy, despotism, monarchy.
But European monarchy instead set in motion a political evolution leading to the incessant and not at all cyclical transformation of the internal constitution of states, one perpetually producing new political and social forms. Monarchy set history in motion, and we are still living with the consequences. Fs 8c What explains the extreme originality and unequalled dynamism of European monarchy?
It was the stable compromise between the religious sacred and the civic sacred, making the king the keystone of the sacred system. But in spite of all his ostentatious religious attributes, in spite of the coronation rites, sacred rituals, and occasional miracles, the king in Europe was never able to play the role that emperors played in the East.
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There, although the emperor might launch himself into the most extravagant conquests, he remained the great preserver of his society and its civilization. This passively sublime, or sublimely passive role, was forbidden the king in the West: there he had to act continuously, and act on his society. Fs 9a What was the principle of this action? The king could not seize and retain the things most sacred to Christianity. The figure of the king as Christ, for example, did not succeed in acquiring a lasting consistency, for obvious reasons. He undertook the establishment of the secular city, the civitas hominum; he made it one as he himself was one.
In principle, of course, the Church left man free to organize the earthly city as he saw fit. But the king alone was capable of taking on the responsibility and effectively assuming this role left to man. Only by looking at it does the subsequent political development become intelligible. One can present this problem in an almost mathematical form: "given the characteristics of the Catholic Church, find the political form X that makes it possible to ensure the secular world's independence.
There is much less artifice than one might think in such a presentation, even if it benefits from the advantages of retrospection: this particular problem was certainly, over many centuries, the major problem faced by European peoples. In formulating it in this way, I am presupposing no particular interpretation of Christianity's meaning, or even of man's political condition. Moreover, by placing ourselves in the perspective of the actors themselves, we unlearn what we know or think we know about our history.
We give ourselves a chance of avoiding subsequent recourse to concepts born after the Church's political defeat in the great battles that concern us, especially that of secularization. We can now understand the notions that made it possible to envisage and implement modern politics, the notions thanks to which we consider ourselves modern. They were born in and arise from this polemical situation. Now we must try to grasp more precisely the spirit in which they were first elaborated.
Stichwort: Machiavelli 1; um Versuch d. Emazipation v. Kurzinhalt: The principles of classical antiquity were not sufficient for gaining the secular world's independence from the Church. Aristotle interpreted human life in terms of goods and ends, all organized in a hierarchy. It was not easy to escape the Church's hold, since it was supported not only by the external power of a dominating institution, but also and especially, by a spiritual conviction.
People might very well have wanted to revolt against this great power authorized by Christ. But how could they have conceived what they vaguely desired? How could they have conceived of the secular rights of "nature" that they wanted to set against the Church? It seems obvious to us today because the undertaking triumphed. But in the thirteenth or fifteenth century things were not so clear. Fs 10b The first major attempt to emancipate man's political nature took place around in Italy.
It was at this time that the rediscovery of Aristotle's works, thanks to their translation into Latin, had its full effect. This great intellectual event was also a great political event. Up to that time, ancient thought had hardly been known in Western Christendom except for the fragments preserved by the Church Fathers, Saint Augustine in particular. Whether approved or criticized, ancient thought had been used for Christian ends. By the fourteenth century it could speak for itself, in its own words, or at least in remarkably faithful translations.
That meant that the natural, or secular, world found itself potentially emancipated from Christian categories, and in control of its own destiny. The Church's exclusive intellectual reign was over. It was at this time, in Italy, that opposition to the papacy's political power found its first classic expressions, in the works of Dante and Marsilius of Padua. Fs notabene 11a This first effort was short-lived. The subsequent development of European politics did not follow the principles proposed by Dante or Marsilius. There was certainly a contextual reason for this: Dante and Marsilius placed their political hopes in a regeneration of the Empire.
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We have seen that this solution was not viable. But there was also a fundamental intellectual reason for their failure: their Aristotelianism, thanks to which they could assert the consistency, richness, and nobility of the natural world, did not allow them to guarantee the independence of politics from the Church's claims. Why was this? Why did the secular world's emancipation from the Church not follow the principles of rediscovered classical antiquity?
Why was political modernity not simply a prolonged and expanded Renaissance? Why did it later break with Aristotle and Cicero, its first allies, as well as with the Church? Fs notabene 11b The principles of classical antiquity were not sufficient for gaining the secular world's independence from the Church. Thus his teaching made it possible for Dante and Marsilius to describe with great subtlety the structure of secular life, to show its goodness and dignity. But by presenting human life as a hierarchy of goods and ends, Aristotle's teaching was vulnerable to the Christian claim that the good brought by the Church is greater, the end it reveals is higher, than any merely natural good or end.
Consequently, Aristotle's philosophy could be used both to express the Church's claim to earthly sovereignty and to express the world's protest against the Church. This is why the greatest Aristotelian after Aristotle was a doctor and saint of the Church: Thomas Aquinas. Thomas believed that Aristotle's philosophy contained everything accessible to natural reason. The Christian revelation added other, higher truths to these natural ones, but without invalidating them: "Grace perfects nature, it does not destroy it.
The fact that it lent itself to both of these uses sufficed for demonstrating that it could not be the basis for a new political definition of relationships between the secular city-state and the Church. It was too heavy a weapon, which fell naturally from the hands of the one using it into those of his adversary.
In the end, the Church knew best how to hold on to it, and it consecrated Thomas as its Doctor communis, "universal teacher. If I assume that nature has its own goodness and that grace has a superior but not conflicting one, if I assume that man has two unequal but equally legitimate ends, which one must I obey here and now? The Church, taught by Thomas, replied: one must consult prudence, heightened by faith. This answer could not satisfy those who wanted to define the independence of the natural world in a clear-cut and incontestable way.
Aristotle, whether interpreted by Thomas, Dante, or Marsilius, did not enable them to solve our theologico-political problem. Fs 12a The problem was finally resolved, or at least the case decided, two centuries later by Machiavelli. As noted above, it was in Dante's and Marsilius's time that European political thought fell into step with the political situation. It might be added that with Machiavelli political thought became a full participant in the political situation. Henceforth, it was impossible to understand political history without having previously grasped the broad outlines of the history of political thought.
Fs 12b Those, like Dante and Marsilius, who considered Aristotle's thought to be universally valid still had to admit that it had been born in a radically different political context. The Greek city-state, unlike the Italian city-state, had no experience with the political claims of a universal Church. Thus they had to assert the universal validity of his thought and yet subject it to considerable modifications. We have noted the most important of these modifications: Marsilius and Dante argued in favor of the Empire, a political form regarded by Aristotle as inferior to the city-state, even barbarous.
In Machiavelli modernity found an interpretation of itself that determined the orientation of the European mind, and hence of European political history, from that moment on. Fs 12c But is it not wildly arbitrary to attribute such power to one man? Only a complete account of the development of modern thought and politics after Machiavelli could justify crediting him with a founding role. But in any case we are not ascribing "superhuman" power to the man. The interpretation of modern experience through Machiavelli simply sheds a particularly brilliant light on certain of its fundamental aspects.
For it was in the service of a political project, the radical discrediting of the Church's political claims, that numerous men who nurtured this project used Machiavelli to guide their thought and action. By basing themselves on his thought, they transformed the political world: from simple interpretation, from a "theoretical" point of view, it became a part of "real" life.
It compelled recognition even from those who had not shared the original project. Fs 12d I am not about to analyze Machiavelli's thought in detail: first because it is not a part of the principal theme of this essay, next because it is especially subtle, and thus especially resistant to a succinct presentation. With an author of Machiavelli's rank, the surface contains, so to speak, the depth.
Pathologien, Hermeneutik d. Misstrauens, Aspekt d. Kurzinhalt: The nobles have a positive end, but it is wicked: to oppress. The people have no positive end, only a negative one: not to be oppressed Textausschnitt: 13a Machiavelli was Florentine. His "experience of modern things" was the experience of political life in a city-state. We have seen that the city-state was both particularly unfriendly toward the Church and particularly vulnerable when dealing with it.
This situation of a quite powerless hostility naturally led to the idea of radically excluding religion from the city-state, of closing off completely the city-state from religion's influence. Certain historians consider that Machiavelli and those who followed him were not hostile to religion as such, only to its excesses and corruptions. Fs 13b What do we know about Machiavelli when we know nothing about him?
We know that he taught evil: how to take and keep power by ruse and force, how to carry through a conspiracy to a successful conclusion. He taught that one must not threaten or insult one's enemy, but that when one has the chance to kill him, then it must be done. We moderns, who like abstract words, readily speak of Machiavelli's political "realism. The absence, so to speak, of these wicked actions is also a "reality. They have always known it: how can the obvious be ignored?
It is true, however, that the most authoritative authors dealing with political matters did not emphasize this point. Above all they saw in politics the goods that it brought. For Aristotle, looking properly at the city-state meant considering it according to its end: the city-state was the only framework within which man could fulfill his nature as a rational animal, by practicing the civic end moral virtues that permitted him to demonstrate his excellence.
Aristotle knew very well that political life has its pathology, its revolutions, its changes of regimes, often accompanied by violence; he devoted book 5 of his Politics to them. But to have concentrated men's attention exclusively on these phenomena would have caused them to lose sight of their own end and that of the city-state. Fs 13d Machiavelli on the contrary persuades us to fix our attention exclusively, or almost exclusively, on pathologies. He wants to force us to lose what, after having read him, we shall be tempted to call our "innocence.
The characterization is justified inasmuch as these three authors urged us to doubt our best motives. But Machiavelli was the first to carry suspicion to the strategic point of men's life: their political life. His suspicion has never left us since. Just listen to this portrait of the soul suffering from suspicion: And it is not just in affairs of the heart that this moral weakening, this powerlessness of lasting impressions can be noticed: it is happening everywhere.
Fidelity in love is a force like religious belief, like the enthusiasm for liberty. Now we have no force left. We no longer know how to love, or to believe or to desire. Everybody doubts the truth of what he says, smiles at the vehemence of what he asserts, and hastens the end of what he is feeling. To understand how modern politics was set in motion and developed, one must have previously grasped the change in what has to be called the status of the good.
Fs notabene 14b How did Machiavelli go about trying to convince us of the central character of evil in politics? What he liked to study best were "extreme situations": foundings of city-states, changes in regimes, conspiracies. He did not deny that in ordinary circumstances civic life can be quite peaceful, that what men call justice can reign there to an appreciable degree. The "good" happens and is maintained only through the "bad. It considers the city-state an artificial island constructed by violent means.
It is not open to anything beyond itself; it is intelligible only in relation to what brings it about. That means that it becomes unwise and even absurd to want to "improve" or "perfect" the city-state's "good" thanks to a "superior" one that religion would undertake to provide. Such a contribution would only disturb the natural functioning of the city-state. An example will suffice.
Christianity produced a certain softening of mores. The political consequence of this was that generally, when a city-state was captured, men were no longer run through with a sword and the women and children were no longer reduced to slavery. Machiavelli shows that from the moment that the citizen's identification of his instinct for self-preservation with the instinct for the city-state's preservation is lost, the motivating force of civic life and morality is fatally weakened.
The public good can only be brought about by the power of violence and fear. To insist on the violent conditioning of the city-state, or to point out the political evils produced by Christianity's intrusion into civic life, therefore amounts to the same thing: the political order is now a closed circle having its own foundation within itself, or rather below itself.
To assert the necessity and fecundity of evil is now to assert the self-sufficiency of the earthly, secular order. Stichwort: Machiavelli 2; Vgl. I Principe, Kap. Politik - Unschuld d. Volkes; Plato, A. Kurzinhalt: Machiavelli did not elaborate the idea of an institution capable of opposing the encroachments of the Roman Church. That was accomplished by Hobbes.
Instead, by discrediting the idea of the good, Machiavelli persuaded men to consider evil Textausschnitt: 15a Up to this point, I have limited myself to recalling the flavor of Machiavelli's teaching, more than the teaching itself. Let me risk a brief incursion into the substance of his argument, in chapter 9 of The Prince.
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Studies in the ideology of advanced industrial societies Boston : Beacon , Seine Idee vo. Studienarbeit aus dem Jahr im Fachbereich Politik - Politische Theorie und Ideengeschichte, Note: 1,0, Universitat Passau, Veranstaltung: HS: Die Geschichte der Menschenrechte, 10 Quellen im Literaturverzeichnis, Sprache: Deutsch, Abstract: Thomas Hobbes gilt als einer der Weichensteller fur das neuzeitliche Denken der politischen Philosophie, in welchem ein grundlegender Perspektivenwechsel stattfindet: "War das mittelalterliche Denken charakterisiert durch die Orientierung an einer vorgegebenen Seinsordnung, die letztlich in Gott verburgt ist, und das Sich-Einlassen auf diese Ordnung, so wird neuzeitlich gerade der Zweifel an jeder Ordnung zum Leitfaden der Gewissheit.
Die wesentliche Frage, auf die Hobbes in seinen Werken eine Antwort zu geben versucht, lautet daher, wie ein Staat unter den Gegebenheiten der menschlichen Natur ausgestaltet sein muss, damit er dauerhaft bestehen und seinen einzelnen Gliedern ein bestmogliches Leben garantieren kann. Worin jedoch sieht Thomas Hobbes die wesentlichen Merkmale des Menschen?
Wie gestaltet sich menschliches Zusammenleben, wenn keine ordnende Hand eingreift und welche Regeln benotigt eine Gemeinschaft, wenn sie ihren Bestand sichern mochte? Und insbesondere: Wieviel Freiheit kann dem einzelnen in einem Hobbesschen Staat zugestanden werden? In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden diese Fragen anhand einer Analyse des im Jahre erschienenen Werkes "Leviathan" behandelt, wobei der Untersuchung der dort entwickelten Freiheitskonzeption besonderes Gewicht zukommt.
No Dust Jacket. Original publisher's black cloth, lettered white on spine and front cover.
Text in German. Mit einem Anhang sowie einem Nachwort des Herausgebers. Seller Inventory C Published by Cambridge: University Press, About this Item: Cambridge: University Press, No Jacket. Original cloth. Near Fine, without dust jacket. Obwohl beide Autoren aus verschiedenen Epochen stammen- Hobbes aus dem Bredekamp, , S.
Im Mittelpunkt meiner Arbeit soll das Frontispiz der erschienenden Erstausgabe des Leviathan von Thomas Hobbes, der als Erfinder der neuzeitlichen Philosophie gilt vgl. Kersting, , S. Brandt, , S. Im ersten Abschnitt meiner Arbeit werde ich den Historischen K. Im Mittelpunkt seiner Theorie steht der Gedanke der Fairnessgerechtigkeit, die als Legitimationsgrundlage von politischen Institutionen dienen soll. Im Folgenden wird die Staatstheorie Thomas Hobbes' grundlegend vorgestellt.
Das Konzept der Verfahrensger. Vor allem sein politisches Traktat "Leviathan," das im Jahr veroffentlicht wurde, ist ein uberragendes Werk der neuzeitlichen Philosophie und ein Grundungsbuch der politischen Moderne. Obwohl das Machtwerk "Leviathan" mehr als dreieinhalb Jahrhunderte alt ist, ist es immer noch ein Schlusseltext fur das politisch-philosophische Verstandnis.
In seinem Machtwerk thematisiert er vor allem die, aus der naturlichen Ausstattung des Menschen folgende, Notwendigkeit der Staatsgrundung sowie die machtpolitische Gestalt des Staates. Thomas Hobbes wendet unterdessen diesen Ausdruck auf den souveranen Staat an.
Der "Leviathan" hat die Aufmerksamkeit vieler Forscher erregt. Die beiden Theoretiker haben unser heutiges Bild von Hobbes gepragt und die politische Theorie in groem Mae beeinflusst. Auch der Philosoph Wolfgang Kersting, der sich intensiv mit dem Machtbegriff bei Thomas Hobbes auseinandergesetzt hat, sollte an dieser Stelle nicht unerwahnt bleiben. Das Ziel dieser Arbeit besteht darin, die Bedeutung von Macht in "Leviathan" aufzudecken und zu klaren, welche Funktio. Der Hunger, die Not treibt ihn zu dieser Tat.
Mensch gegen Mensch. Naumburg, zur gleichen Zeit. Zwischen und erlebt Naumburg seinen Niedergang. Die Einwohnerzahl dezimiert sich um 51 Prozent. Der Krieg rafft die Menschen danieder. Dies sieht Hobbes zumindest im Naturzustand so. Einer Phase, ohne Staat. Verfallen wir in der Anarchie au. Ob es neben diesen augenscheinlich sehr absoluten Eigenschaften auch liberale Aspekte im Leviathan gibt, soll in der folgenden Arbeit untersucht werden.
Da John Rawls mit seiner normativen Theorie des politischen Liberalismus die liberale Ordnung Anfang der er Jahre neu konzipiert hat, soll der Leviathan besonders unter diesen politikphilosophischen Aspekten betrachtet werden. Dazu werden zuerst einmal die Kriterien des Liberalismus als politische Theorie 2 , und speziell die Theorie von John Rawls 2. Davon ausgehend wird untersucht, wo der Leviathan zwischen Totalitarismus und Liberali.