However, the memory of the Yeltsin era is abhorred by the Russian people, who saw their country plundered by the oligarchs, and their standard of living fall into a veritable abyss, while Russia was pushed around on the international stage like a freshman pledge on fraternity row. His main opponent in the election that brought him to power was the virulently anti-Western Communist Party, which he handily defeated, with the even more anti-Western Russian nationalists coming in third. This set up the present standoff, in which the countries of the former Warsaw Pact were forced to choose between Brussels and Moscow.
What comes after Putin, in this context, is something much worse. And in that case, the prospect of war will loom large on the horizon. If Hillary Clinton gets into the White House, you can be sure the tensions with Russia will reach fever pitch. The great danger is that a cold war may very well become a hot one — and that raises the specter that we lived with for half a century, the very real possibility of a nuclear war.
To compare Putin to Stalin, or Hitler, is absurd: Russia has come a long way since the days of the Gulag, when 60 million people were killed and imprisoned. If we want to push Russia back into the darkness, then the policy we are presently pursuing is the way to go: But please note that my tweets are sometimes deliberately provocative, often made in jest, and largely consist of me thinking out loud. The Life of Murray N. McFaul, a staunch anti-Putin crusader whose time as ambassador was marred by countless failures and embarrassing public blunders, went so far as to cast doubt on the commitment to human rights of Mr.
Dion and the Canadian Government. If this is an important value [sic] then this is something that should be done. Indeed, Browder is undeniably the leading voice of the transnational lobbying effort to internationalize the Magnitsky Act — a US law passed in that places sanctions and restrictions on key figures in the Russian government ostensibly over alleged participation in the murder of whistleblower Sergei Magnitsky — and to try to isolate Russian President Putin and his closest advisers.
Of course, embarrassingly for Browder, he was until a decade ago the leading pro-Putin voice in the western investing community in Russia, lauding Putin up and down as the savior of Russia. Saudi Arabia must be rewarded with tens of billions of dollars of military equipment. Ultimately, the issue is really about control. The US would like to be able to control the way in which Canada, and all the countries of the West, carry on their relations with Russia. And the US believes that the combination of sanctions, depressed oil prices, Magnitsky-style legislation, and a number of other political, economic, and diplomatic weapons will bring those pesky old Russians to heel.
How little Washington has learned. Once again the current Pentagon supremo, certified neocon Ash Carter, did not disappoint at the Shangri-La Dialogue — the annual, must-go regional security forum in Singapore attended by top defense ministers, scholars and business executives from across Asia. And it takes place in the privileged aircraft carrier of imperial geostrategic interests in South East Asia: Real threats are predictably embedded in the rhetoric.
The South China Sea, the throughway of trillions of US dollars in annual trade, doubles as home to a wealth of unexplored oil and gas. The Beijing delegation kept its cool — to a point. In fact China has already reached what is called a four-point consensus with Brunei, Cambodia and Laos on the South China Sea two months ago. That implies no Washington interference.
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Well, Beijing has already made its own choice; and that entails a multipolar world of sovereign nations with no primus inter pares. Wily Chinese diplomacy — and trade — knows how to use the system to advance Chinese national interests. Plan A in Washington is containment — with possibly dangerous ramifications. There is no Plan B. Beijing is engaged in building a new, multipolar order. Pepe Escobar is an independent geopolitical analyst.
He is the former roving correspondent for Asia Times Online. The following experts have — at some point during the last 2 years — said that the economic crisis could be worse than the Great Depression:. More young adults in the U. Similar long-term trends have been observed elsewhere. And in Japan, the share of to year-olds living with their parents grew from Choice for voters in November amounts to death by hanging or firing squad. Democracy is pure fantasy. Trump was the last GOP aspirant….
Governing Through Lies And Deception. Genetically Engineered Golden Rice: The War on Syria and the Refugee Crisis: Syria Solidarity Movement is an international network in solidarity with the Syrian people and their struggle to retain a secular, independent state. The similarity in names has…. Jeanette Shannon of Detroit was evicted from her home on June 3 after a protracted fight against fraudulent real estate interests and the local courts which favor the predatory lenders and the banks.
This was a test case for Detroit…. Binoy Kampmark , June 08 Never underestimate the power of the puncturing prank. Consider, for instance, a pair of glasses…. The Syrian government forces use Russian-made T90C main battle tanks in the area. This confirms the importance of the operation for the Syrian government. Militants used rocket artillery, mortars and anti-aircraft cannons to attack neighborhoods of the city. About 40 civilians and troops were killed by the shelling and some injured. We remember, in May, the Russian military staff reported that Al Nusra front concentrated a 6,strong attack force in the area of Aleppo.
However, this operation in Northern Aleppo has withdrawn a significant force of the SDF and its US supporters, halting the attempts to launch a full-scale operation to liberate the city of Raqqa in the nearest future. Regarding the way the server was handled, almost everything needed to determine criminal liability is already in the public record and has been for a while. So here are three data points, just three. They line up perfectly so the main idea is easy to grasp. This means that email going to and from the server was unencrypted during transmission.
Messages were sent and received in plain text. The server was nothing remarkable, the kind of system often used by small businesses, according to people familiar with its configuration at the end of her tenure. It consisted of two off-the-shelf server computers. Both were equipped with antivirus software. They were linked by cable to a local Internet service provider.
A firewall was used as protection against hackers. It is unknown whether the system had some other way to encrypt the email traffic at the time. Without encryption — a process that scrambles communication for anyone without the correct key — email, attachments and passwords are transmitted in plain text. The system had other features that made it vulnerable to talented hackers, including a software program that enabled users to log on directly from the World Wide Web. It is not clear whether he had any help.
Pagliano had also provided computer services to the Clinton family. The Post article is much longer and contains a great deal of information. For more on Pagliano, see below. Certainly not deliberately so, but a fact nonetheless. Bryan Pagliano will decline to answer questions from Judicial Watch, the conservative legal watchdog group, during a deposition scheduled for Monday, his lawyers wrote in a court filing on Wednesday afternoon.
The move forecloses the possibility that Pagliano would break his months of silence about the server issue, even as scrutiny has intensified on his role. Check the first story above to review what he can speak about. There will perhaps be political consequences from this. Will there be legal consequences? Again, my emphasis below:. If the server was hacked, broken into, the above law appears to apply. Will we ever find out? Still, these data points have been on my mind since I discovered them.
By the way, the list of laws that may have been broken, not to mention State Department practices and guidelines ignored, is proffered to be long, at least according to the Internet.
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And again, this is all from the public record, and every piece but the middle one has been there, out in the open, for a while. This may be nothing or not-nothing. In the s, Mendez was a young Uruguayan teacher with leftist leanings. She lived there in safety until that country suffered its own coup in That July, a joint Uruguayan-Argentine military commando group kidnapped her in Buenos Aires and deposited her at Automotores Orletti, a former auto repair shop that would become infamous as a torture site and paramilitary command center.
He held power from to Those convictions are deeply satisfying to the surviving victims and their families, to the legal teams that worked for more than a decade on the case, and to human rights organizations around the world. And yet, as just as this outcome is, it has left me with questions — questions about the length of time between crime and conviction, and about what kinds of justice can and cannot be achieved through prosecutions alone. Operation Condor was launched by the security forces of five military dictatorships: Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia.
Brazil soon joined, as did Ecuador and Peru eventually. As a Cold War anti-communist collaboration among the police, military, and intelligence services of those eight governments, Condor offered an enticing set of possibilities. The various services could not only cooperate, but pursue their enemies in tandem across national borders.
Raha Mugisho] on prog Indeed, its reach stretched as far as Washington, D. Orlando Letelier and his young assistant, Ronni Moffitt, both of whom then worked at the Institute for Policy Studies, a left-wing think tank. How many people suffered grievously or died due to Operation Condor? And although its story is less well known, the similar reign of terror of the Uruguayan dictatorship directly affected the lives of almost every family in the country. Comparable percentages for the United States would involve the emigration of thirty million people, the detention of five million, and the extended incarceration of five hundred thousand.
And what was the U. And what did the CIA get in return? There is no question that the U. Why did it take 40 years to bring the architects of Operation Condor to justice? In the first years of the new civilian government, the Argentine congress passed two laws that granted these men immunity from prosecution for crimes committed in the dirty war.
Since then, many human rights crimes have been prosecuted. Indeed, Reynaldo Bignone, the former dictator, was already in jail when sentenced in May for his role in Operation Condor. He had been convicted in of kidnapping, torture, and murder in the years of the dirty war. How could justice delayed for that long be anything but justice denied? This is a crucial step in the process of making its victims, and the nations involved, whole again. It took four decades to get those convictions. Then something surprising happened.
As he wrote in his piece,. Yet I am firmly convinced there should be no war crimes prosecutions. The call to prosecute is the Siren Song of the carceral state — the very philosophy we need to dismantle. In other words, one of the leading legal opponents of everything the war on terror represents is firmly opposed to the idea of prosecuting officials of the Bush administration for war crimes though he has not the slightest doubt that they committed them. He doubts that such trials are the best way to do so, fearing that by placing all the blame for the events of those years on a small number of criminal officials, the citizens of an at least nominally democratic country could be let off the hook for a responsibility they, too, should share.
Margulies, in other words, raises important questions. When people talk about bringing someone to justice they usually imagine a trial, a conviction, and perhaps most important, punishment. But he has reminded me of my own longstanding ambivalence about the equation between punishment and justice. Every nation that institutionalizes torture, as the United States has done, selects specific groups of people as legitimate targets for its application. The practice of torture in the U. It began when European settlers first treated native peoples and enslaved Africans as subhuman savages.
As southern farmers started importing captured Africans to augment their supply of indentured English labor, they quickly realized that there was little incentive for those slaves to work — none but the pain of whippings, mutilations, and brandings, and the threat of yet more pain. Torture and slavery, in other words, were fused at the root. From the first arrival of black people on this continent, it has been permissible, even legal, to torture them. After the end of slavery, southern states began the practice of convict leasing — arresting former slaves and then their descendants, often on trumped-up charges, and renting them out as labor to farmers and later coal mine owners who had the power and legal right to whip and abuse them as they chose.
Bush, Dick Cheney, and other top officials in their administration in prison for war crimes would be justice, we endorse a criminal justice system that is more criminal than just, and where torture is a daily occurrence. Do we want to do to Bush, Cheney, and their accomplices essentially what they did to their victims? And yet, would this truly provide even a facsimile of justice, given that American prisons are hardly instruments of justice to begin with? How, then, can we find justice through a prison system that uses similar methods on an everyday basis here in the U.
The first answer is: Then there are all those in the rest of the world who have to live with the threat of a nuclear-armed superpower that has in these years regularly refused to recognize the most basic aspects of the rule of law. Many who work with survivors of organized repression like Operation Condor say that their primary desire is not the punishment of their oppressors but official acknowledgement of what happened to them. Torturers and murderers on both sides of the anti-apartheid struggle were offered amnesty for their crimes — but only after they openly acknowledged those crimes.
In this way, a public record of the horrors of apartheid was built, and imperfect as the process may have been, the nation was able to confront its history. That is the kind of reckoning we need in this country. Justice would also require — to the extent possible — making whole those who had been harmed. Convention against Torture requires. In the case of the Iraq War, justice would undoubtedly also require financial reparations to repair the infrastructure of what was once a modern, developed nation.
The second, equally important message is that the whites and the Christians but mostly the white Christians have been behaving, for centuries and all over the world, like a horde of savage beasts and genocidal maniacs. After several depressing days in Paris, I was finally leaving that gray, increasingly depressing, oppressive and self-righteous Europe behind. Pourquoi me parlez vous des musulmans, moi je vous parle des juifs? Frank Le terrorisme est une invention des bandes juives comme stern et Ergoun. L'attentat contre l'hotel king david etait le debut du terrorisme.
Les juifs doivent en permanence tenter de tromper les Non-juifs". Thiery, quel livre doit-on consulter pour connaitre plus sur ce projet humain et genereux qui nous attend? Pour ce qui est des autres religions, je n'y connais pas grand-chose, pas assez pour pouvoir me prononcer. Louis-Alexandre Si on rien a dire, on la ferme. Le roi est nu, il reste le chantage, sa tient pour le moment. Si nous avions la meme mentalite que nos voisins, le probleme de l'Islam dans le monde serait regle depuis belle lurette. Il n'y a pas qu'au Liban, les Protocoles et Mein Kampf sont des best sellers dans tout le monde arabe et ne parlons pas de l'abjecte propagande nazie des palestiniens.
Luis Alexander A force d'essayer de se montrer plus inteligent, on attire l'intention sur son imbecilite. Et les palestinines ils se battent pour quoi? En plus, le sionisme est-il un mouvement de liberation international? J'ai l'impression d'un caniche qui essaie de se faire bien voir. Tu es assez niais pour imaginer que les meilleurs parviennent toujours aux postes de direction? Mon grand-pere arrive de Pologne en Palestine en me racontait les pogroms et les meutres commis par les fedaynes.
Leur seul souhait maintenant est de tourner la page: IR nous dit que cette affaire est anodine sic mais apparement ce n'est pas le cas. Le piston, le copinage tu connais? Les autres le font pas peut-etre? Le convaincre, c'est une autre paire de manche. Le mouvement Kach reconnait le "transfert" des Son drapeau n'est pas celui de son peuple. En bref, Israel est le pays de son ennemi, pas le sien. Certains d'entre eux pourraient rester sous certaines conditions, mais la plupart d'entre eux devraient partir. Pour tout le monde. Pour tous le monde. Pour eux comme pour nous. A la fois faibles et puissants.
Puissants parce que faibles. Et on obtient une belle pagaille de bons sentiments. Luis-Alex Reveilles toi, tu delires. Le conflit israelo-palestinien date de plus d'un demi siecle. Les premiers resistants palestiniens etaient des athees, des communistes, des chretiens des japonais des allemands ainsi de suite.
L;argument religieux etait prone uniquement par les israeliens. Une sorte de la piece maitresse: Alors je te reptete ce que je t'ai deja dit: Si on a rien a dire on la ferme. Nous sommes tous les ministres de Dieu, ses serviteurs. Nous sommes tous aussi uniques que nos empreintes digitales. Quel magnifique compliment! Un choix intelligent. Bref, de la chaleur. Ce que Roger Dudley dit me semble vrai. Bref, soyez chaleureux! Ne faites rien sans prier. Ne leur faites pas de sermon. Quels principes sont essentiels au processus de discipulat? En quoi consiste un tel processus? Et vous? Quel est votre but?
Rachel Aitken, fondatrice de Digital Discipleship en. Donnez un cours de cuisine en diffusion continue en direct. Faites donc un effort intentionnel. Construction du patrimoine. Nous imitons simplement notre Seigneur […] en offrant notre amour sans condition4. Jeffrey O. En voici un exemple. Pourquoi y a-t-il si peu de gens croissant Il habite avec sa famille — et de nombreux alpagas!
Le temps passe. Cependant — et heureusement! Y a-t-il quelque chose qui cloche? Aux feux, nous traversons la rue. Les gens observent. The complexity of Origins is that it models the recognition of a con- tingent such connection, even as it pursues more straightforwardly lin- ear and genealogical explanations for how racisms are related.
I begin with the latter. When combined with changing political exigencies, Arendt contends, this race-thinking lent itself to various manifestations of focused, ideological racism. So, for instance, did imperial racism serve the requirements of overseas expansion, or antisemitism serve the requirements of political reactions on the conti- nent. European racisms might have functioned differently and targeted different groups, but they all proceeded from shared discursive ground. This genealogical demonstration by Arendt carries an unspoken and overlooked corollary critical to the rest of Origins: a mutual intelligibility between racisms that, owing to their common discursive source, made it easy for them to reinforce each other.
Searching, as she wrote Origins in the late s, to explain the totalitarian tragedy that had engulfed Europe, Arendt seized among other factors on the Scramble for Africa and the role she felt it had played in unleashing the hitherto latent potential for race-thinking to destroy the European body politic. If various continental and imperial racisms shared a common origin in race- thinking, then it was natural enough that they should easily interrelate, like the separated branches of a river joining again with torrential force.
Surging forth from Europe, then gaining potency in Africa before returning to the continent with a vengeance, superluity provides Arendt a conceptual pivot around which to portray the Jews as the inal and arguably most quintessential victims of empire. What this lasting boomerang imagery has tended to obscure is that, for Arendt, European Jews were not just the inal repository of the superluity set in motion by imperialism; they were also among the very irst. The resultant low of bourgeois capital into the imperial project dislodged the Jews from their traditional, privileged role as bankers to the state.
The two processes are related, with the earlier attribution to the Jews of superluity setting the stage for a later attempt at eradication. But a fundamental difference also remains. Her notion of a perceived Jewish superluity in the initial wake of the Scramble for Africa, however, posits a more contingent relationship between antisemitism and empire.
If the promise of overseas riches prompted bourgeois investors to displace the Jews as inanciers to the state, this had little to do with imperial racism, at least as regards the Jews. The same conditions for antisemitism would presumably have arisen had the bourgeoisie found any other reason to overcome its tra- ditional disinterest in state-backed commerce, or had the Jews them- selves simply decided to withhold their capital from governments.
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For one thing, it confounds the genealogical relex that conceives European Jewry as the eventual target— or, as I discussed in the Introduction, the prototypical target— of discourses and practices aimed at imperial subalterns. For another, it attends to the prehistory of the Holocaust rather than to the Holocaust itself, a peripherality compounded by the dificulty of connecting Nazi exterminationism to the modern anti- semitism Arendt attributes to a Scramble for Africa in which England and France played far greater roles than Germany.
If European Jews were displaced from state inance by the advent of empire, and if that displacement provoked the antisemitic groundswell Arendt attributes to it, then there is a grand historical irony indeed to the subsequent antisemitic ascrip- tion of unpopular imperial developments to Jewish connivance with the state. A similar logic prevailed, mutatis mutandis, when at the turn of the century British antisemites charged Jewish dia- mond and gold interests in the South African Rand with embroiling Britain in the bloody Second Boer War — The displacement thesis accommodates this counterintuitive outcome, theoretically at least.
When legiti- mized by their formal or quasi-formal arrangements with the state, Jews could at least command a grudging respect for their observable role in the administration of power. But once they had lost this role, all bets were off. By divesting Jews of their longstanding capacity as inanciers to the state, the bourgeois-inanced imperial project deinitively removed the phan- tasmic Jew to the smoke-illed back rooms where plots were hatched and governments bought.
Anything was thinkable now, even the pos- sibility that soldiers might be sent halfway across the world to die in unwitting defense of Jewish inancial interests. I will return to this momentarily. Note, for the time being, that Arendt herself comments little in Origins about the apparently paradoxical accusation by antisemites of imperial mal- feasance against a European Jewry sidelined from and by the impe- rial project. Perhaps, too, Arendt did not press the issue because she sensed that the displacement thesis itself rested on shaky historical ground.
The most zealously imperialist of all French governments, the Third Repub- lic — , opened its ranks like never before to Jewish public servants. It bears asking, in fact, whether Jews were ever anywhere really dis- placed as inanciers to the state by bourgeois investment in the impe- rial project. Arendt provides no evidence for this imperial decline in Jewish inancial relevance to states and even dates the beginning of the decline to the irst half of the nineteenth century, before the era of high empire.
Usefully, the displacement thesis implic- itly adopts a perspective that other possible interpretive frameworks risk missing. Consider my attempt, in the following chapter, to explain antisemitic colonial conspiracy theories as a projection onto Jews of anxieties about empire. Too supericially approached, that model invites reducing modern antisemitism to a simple cognate of the racial anxiety triggered and institutionalized by the encounter with impe- rial subalterns. The displacement thesis points the way toward accomplishing some- thing different.
For all their remove from the actual business of conquest or from comparative racial taxonomies, these preoccupations remained no less inlected by the unique geopolitical circumstances of empire. Such circumstances furnished modern antisemitism the mate- rial for what I am calling racial scalarity: that is, representations of Jews informed by the possibility that one might move between scales, in particular the national and global-imperial ones.
So, for example, as I will be arguing in Chapter 2, did modern French antisemitism enable the translation of a troubling imperial alterity into a Jewish otherness more tolerable because reconceived at the scale of the nation. Metropolitan Jewish otherness was here fashioned into a variety of imperial otherness, then, but only because Jewishness had irst pro- vided a springboard for fashioning and representing scale. In other words, the racial relationality implicitly or explicitly posited between metropolitan Jews and imperial subalterns was made ideologically meaningful by an accompanying scalarity.
Such a scalarity was contin- gent, in the way I mean to use the word here, because it was determined by what the whole of empire made possible to think about the Jews, rather than by a more narrowly motivated, one-to-one correspondence imagined between internal and external racial others. We need not agree with the content of the thesis, as I do not, for the basic gesture to remain valuable. Historical accuracy and methodological utility aside, the displace- ment thesis haunts Origins with a troublesomely stubborn ghost: that of a bygone antisemitic narrative of Jewish colonial conspiracy for which Arendt would obviously have shown no patience but whose transposition into her arguments nonetheless structures and delimits Origins in important ways.
That strain caused Arendt to share a basic epistemic tendency— the impulse to link the Jewish and imperial questions—with narratives about Jewish colonial conspiracy. But if she did so without reproducing any attendant antisemitism, the consequences of this tendency reverberate no less uneasily in her work. In so doing, Origins reprises a gesture to which antisemites once resorted when they likewise sought in empire to resolve their own vexed internal logics see Chapters 3 and 4. Hobson, author of the landmark anti-imperialist study Imperialism and a key inluence on her thinking about empire.
But this is to miss a crucial complexity in the interaction of the philosopher with her source. Arendt at irst seems partially to rehearse the antisemitic canard, popularized by Hobson, that Jewish inance greased the wheels of European imperialism.
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She soon qualiies her stance with the now- familiar refrain that bourgeois investment rendered any Jewish impe- rial inluence short-lived. Yet Arendt does so in a way— and the point is capital— that itself adopts the underlying structure of the antisemitic trope bequeathed by Hobson. Empire channeled abroad the superluous labor and wealth generated by capitalism; it expropriated the resources of others to produce further superluous wealth; and inally, having institutionalized the superluity of its agents and victims, it added European Jewry to the disposable ranks of superluous man.
She argued as well that they helped unleash it. Jewish inanciers, Hobson reports, went to South Africa for money, and those who came early and made most have com- monly withdrawn their persons, leaving their economic fangs in the carcass of their prey. They fastened on the Rand. It fol- lows that the Jews themselves were easily made superluous by empire, something to which, as we have seen, Arendt attributes the rise of mod- ern antisemitism.
Notice here the inversion accomplished by Arendt. Hobson at one point considered Jews responsible for the imperial developments he decried. Rather, she exchanges the terms of the equa- tion altogether: whereas Hobson and others blamed Jewish inluence for the rise of empire, Arendt locates in the rise of empire the beginning of a perilous Jewish irrelevance. In other words, Arendt maintains the old causal link between empire and the Jewish question, even if she reverses its polarity.
Arendt is in many ways writing against Hobson. This tradition supplied epistemic grounds for Arendt to think Jews and empire together. One inds it dificult to imagine that Arendt would otherwise have formulated so circum- stantial an explanation for modern antisemitism as the relative non- participation by Jews in empire, given that the terms of her argument would seem inherently to militate against conceiving any relationship between Jews and empire in the irst place.
That her thesis so sym- metrically inverts existing assumptions about Jews and empire only underscores her dependence on so improbable a conceptual forebear. Thus, too, does Arendt draw unlikely correspondences between Jews and the Boers of turn- of-the- century South Africa.
It serves as well, in the man- ner I have been describing, to ofload onto others the structural role played by Jews in the antisemitic narrative about empire that Arendt inherits and reconigures. Simply put, Arendt seeks to make Jews as redundant as possible to the imperial South African economy of superluity she theorizes. What becomes, in that case, of those superluous to superluity itself? Like the negative of a negative, they revert to a positive, at least in the South African context. This only earned them more hatred from the Boers, Arendt adds, because they were now antithetical, in their very productivity, to the parasitic economy of superluity predicated on the racist spoliation of labor and mineral wealth OT, Even so, the mechanisms she invokes to explain the two correlations— suspicion of Jewish productivity in the South African case and suspicion of Jewish non-productivity in the European case— prove dificult to reconcile.
Origins is hence at pains, for reasons internal to its architecture, to cleave the Jew from the workings of empire. Two preliminary conclusions accordingly emerge. The second preliminary conclusion follows from the irst. Echoing the manner in which, for Arendt, empire channeled away a superlu- ity generated by capitalist Europe but uncontainable there, imperial spaces evidently bear a structural relationship in Origins to the quan- dary of superluity intolerably generated by the Arendtian system itself.
But what is this relationship that it should so intertwine, as Origins does, the Jewish and imperial questions? And how does the question of superluity come to exert such pressure on the whole? Yet this does not take into account the oppor- tunities Hobson affords Arendt. Already we have seen how Arendt locates in Hobson a tool for paring the vestigial antisemitism from an anti-imperialist tradition epitomized by Hobson himself.
Arendt might simply have dismissed that association; instead she reframes it, trans- posing the Jews from imperial perpetrators into imperial victims. The symmetry of the transposition is itself noteworthy, however. Arendt proposes a pivotal historical relationship between European Jewry and empire, though not the one imagined by antisemites. But why propose such a relation- ship at all? Arendt surely savored reversing the argument by antisemites that Jews engendered imperialism into the argument that imperialism engendered antisemitism. Nevertheless, one inds it hard to accept that so fundamental a historical claim in Origins should serve an essen- tially derivative rhetorical purpose.
And yet neither is there especially compelling historical evidence for the displacement thesis. Arendt, it becomes increasingly clear, is drawn to Hobson not in spite of his divagations about Jews but on account of them. But the dificulty addressed is not conined, as Arendt would have it, to the mystery of antisemitism. Rather, it extends to what I would argue is the constitutive problem posed by the Jews— or at least by what Arendt makes the Jews incarnate— to her fundamental political and philosophical frame. Arendt submits that emancipation produced a nineteenth- century paradox.
What Jewish difference disappeared in the equality of citizenship, European states reinscribed by only emancipating Jews for what they might provide, as a group apart, to their ledgling state patrons. The resulting civil, de jure inclusion of Jews in the national body thus institutionalized their social, de facto exclusion from it. Empire eroded this already tenuous status of the Jews as included exclusion, displacing them from their national niche when the bour- geoisie partnered with the state in the business of imperial expansion.
Allied, henceforth, with an ascendant class power, states no longer required a socially unaligned partner in the Jews. Prevent- ing these centrifugal forces from rending the nation, while retain- ing the heterogeneity that produced them, the state imposed a tricky equilibrium. But the opposition is somewhat misleading. If the modern state, following Arendt, promised a legitimate politics, it did not do so as some sort of functional, self-immanent repository of val- ues opposable to the uglier tendencies in social existence.
Rather, it did so by providing a common space, a medium if you will, that both gathered citizens together as a collectivity of equals and empowered them, by the same token, to afirm their singularity as individuals. She conceives the European balance of power as having functioned on the same principle of relation and separation, with nations bound together by a common ethos— mutual respect for sovereignty— that simultaneously guaranteed each nation its individual autonomy.
Arendt never remarks that the relational bal- ance among nations is also obviously interdependent with the analo- gously relational balance within nations. But this raises a dificulty Arendt would rather avoid. At the scale of the European comity of nations, however, only interstitiality remains. Nothing within the nations themselves was suficient to regulate their interrelation with one another. It follows that the international order Arendt invokes and by extension the nations it contains and helps deine require something outside the nation-state to function.
In a word: the Jew. Or rather, the Jew is the name Arendt gives to a necessary condition for the equilibrium she details. As inan- cial avatars of the modern state, Jews seeded the public space that relates and separates. That structural liminality made Jews especially vulnerable: It is therefore more than accidental that the catastrophic defeats of the peoples of Europe began with the catastrophe of the Jew- ish people.
It was particularly easy to begin the dissolution of the precarious European balance of power with the elimination of the Jews, and particularly dificult to understand that more was involved in this elimination than an unusually cruel nation- alism or an ill-timed revival of old prejudices. OT, 22 The precariousness of the Jews coincided with the precariousness of the European system of nation-states they helped maintain; destroy one, and you destroyed the other. But either destruction merely culminated a basic disequilibrium introduced, Arendt suggests, by unchecked growth in one of the components of the nation-state system.
So, too, did rampant activity by a single national element, the bourgeoisie, earlier catalyze overseas imperialism at the expense of the state and the inter- stitial equilibrium it sustained. Observe the delection of emphasis here. Rather than entertain the innate precariousness of nation-states uneasily contingent, for their collective and individual existence, on something outside themselves— that is, on an interstitial supplement surrounding and pervading them—Arendt focuses instead on unnatural expansion by nation-states or their constituent elements.
This cancerous proliferation in turn does away with the agents of supplementarity: thus does expansionist totali- tarianism target all Jewry, or bourgeois imperialism overrun the state. But by locating the crisis of the nation-state system in a disequilibrium plaguing its internal ele- ments, then attributing to that disequilibrium the demise of the inter- stitial balance within and among nation-states, Arendt herself erases the problem of supplementarity. Or, more accurately, she defers it.
For if Origins is anything, it is the story of what Arendt believes similarly exceeded and yet deined the modern European order: namely, super- luity, that by-product of capital whose perniciousness she traces from Europe to Africa and back again. Following Hobson and Luxemburg, Arendt presents superluity as the creeping shadow of a capitalist sys- tem permanently dependent for its survival on materials and markets outside itself. In the process, she shifts the fundamental onus of supple- mentarity from the political to the economic, and from the nation-state to empire.
Empire, to be sure, merged the political and the economic by placing public means at the disposal of private business interests. And Arendt certainly allows for a measure of afinity between capitalist superlu- ity and a nationalism always potentially in excess of itself. The other half, the interstitial balance of relation and separation on which hinged the state and the comity of nations, goes unscrutinized. Yet it is to this interstitial balance, tellingly, that Arendt irst turns for the momentum that will sustain the narrative and analytic machin- ery of Origins.
Recall that the state requires, in order to effect the political intercourse for which Arendt valorizes it, the extension everywhere of a binding medium that relates and separates. Within the nation-state, the medium furnishes the interstitial condition for a delicate political balance gathering singular citizens together without collapsing them into the undifferentiated masses of nation and society against which Arendt warns. Above the nation-state, the medium fur- nishes the interstitial basis for the comity of nations and its similarly fragile balance of mutually assured sovereignty.
Arendt understands these balances to possess an ontology apart from the medium that sup- ports them, insofar as they take shape in the shifting, back-and-forth interactions among their participating elements. The medium itself, though, possesses an ontology as well. It is no mere vacuum. Histori- cally speaking, it has needed constitution by something or someone— something or someone, moreover, irreducible to the state.
After all, any individual state lacked the neutrality to facilitate the nineteenth- century comity of nations. This partner, of course, was the Jews. But the unenviable historical role accorded the Jews by Arendt works to obscure an inherent insta- bility in the state dynamic she relates. Functioning as an included exclusion in a system dependent on them only to the extent that they existed apart, the Jews were vulnerable to outright exclusion once the state abandoned its class neutrality, made common cause with the bourgeoisie, and yielded to an imperial system anathema to the old equilibrium of relation and separation.
Hence were they among the irst consigned to superluity by a capitalist imperial order deined by its production and management of superluity. As capitalist Europe both produced and required, in empire, something in excess of itself, so the state pro- duced and required the Jews as that which necessarily exceeded it. In other words, the problem of superluity was not limited to capitalist enterprise. It was also endemic to the state. Origins is structured to defuse this fact. Arendt begins with the Jews in part because, put simply, they vehicle superluity from state to empire.
Earlier I examined how the displacement thesis doubles as a displacement away from the Jews of the imperial guilt assigned them in the colonial conspiracy theory that Arendt reconigures. Now another such second-order displacement becomes evident: that of superluity away from the state. Note, moreover, how the two second-order displacements achieved by the displacement thesis complement each other. What remains is an association between Jewish and imperial histo- ries that helps Arendt locate the source of superluity elsewhere than in the state. This inaugurates, in turn, a binary narrative structuring so much of her analysis in Origins: the losing battle between the modern state and the various modes of superluity— national, social, imperial, racist, totalitarian— that overwhelmed it.
As Arendt later deines it in The Human Condition, modern mass society is the private made dangerously public. It organizes collective life along the principles of individual biological need, perverting citizenry into membership in a single, uniform aggregate of material production and consumption managed by a biopolitics indifferent to plurality. For that state, too, unleashes a similarly uncontrollable and, I will be arguing, similarly biologi- cal element into the world of properly political man. The superlu- ity of the Jews, before Arendt identiies in it an early consequence of empire, is the unavowed superluity always already essential to the pre- carious interstitial balance struck by even the benign, non-imperialized state— a balance so precarious, in fact, that it represents no balance at all, given its innate and perpetual reliance on that which escapes it.
But what, exactly, makes this unavowed superluity troublesome enough for Arendt to repress and defer? Here again the categories elaborated in The Human Condition prove illuminating. Work, in contrast, opposes a permanent domain of man-made arti- ice to the ephemerality of natural existence. More than one com- mentator argues that Arendt misreads Marx by failing to account for, among others things, the similar distinction that Marx himself draws between alienated and unalienated labor. So, for instance, does Seyla Benhabib compellingly maintain that raising children is a world-shaping activ- ity without which no individuals could reasonably grow to occupy the public realm.
One such potential overlap exists in the fact that labor, and not just work, attends the endeavor of world-building. One detects a twinge of anxiety in the vigorousness with which Arendt polices the line between the world and the monotonous upkeep it demands. Is the basic struggle for sustenance really any less violent than the labor of maintenance? One answer rests in the more obviously thankless, Sisyphean quality of the maintenance labor she describes: labor in the ields bears fruit that no scrubbing of loors ever can. Another answer rests in the importance of the effort.
With- out it the world would crumble, an outcome in many ways worse for Arendt than death from lack of sustenance because man would regress back among the animals. But herein lies a complication. The further man rises, in the public world, above the cyclical transience of biologi- cal life, the more labor he creates for animal laborans within the same natural cyclicality governing the maintenance now required.
Arendt indirectly addresses this dilemma by clarifying that while public, political life and private, biological life should remain distinct, they are not mutually exclusive. In the Greek polis, she observes, a minority of citizens were freed by the labor of slaves to pursue the bios politikos. So radical a division of roles came at a tremendous price, however.
Arendt never offers what a more balanced combination of public and private lives might resemble, but it seems reasonable to infer that she envisions a civiliza- tion comprised entirely of public equals in which labor is more evenly distributed. Everyone, ideally, would partake at least to some extent in both the biological satisfactions of animal laborans and the fully real- ized humanity of public man.
The unending maintenance labor gener- ated by world-building thus poses no insuperable contradiction, as long as it falls to emancipated men electing to maintain and preserve the common world whose liberating potential they simultaneously enjoy. What Arendt does not account for is what I will be calling the problem of beginnings, which relates to the conditions necessary for the emergence of a public realm.
Modernity, with its emphasis on individual freedom and equality, emancipated the laboring classes from slavery. But civilization was also moving dangerously further, Arendt contends, from the classical distinction between the two. Still, modernity at least retained the potential for such a differentiation. The benign, pre-imperial modern state described in Origins evokes the classical separation by standing over and against disparate private economic interests to produce a common ground.
Yet the state, as I have maintained, required no help in producing a dificulty of its own, and here it starts to become clearer why. Political equality for citizens of the polis had presupposed a freedom from necessity achieved by private mastery over slaves in the household. Thus, too, did the modern equality guaranteed by the state presup- pose such a freedom— though not on the part of citizens. Now it was the institution of public-ness itself, rather than individual participants, obtaining the necessary autonomy.
But a similarity persisted. To be sure, Jews were rewarded with citizenship. We have seen, though, that the condition of this inclusion in the public realm was their con- tinued social exclusion, since the state courted the Jews precisely for their detachment from class society.
Again, however, Arendt defers onto the social something that already begins with the state. Aligned as they were with the state, the Jews more resembled a structural feature of the common world than full-ledged participants inside it. Others might sit around the table; but the Jews were the table. The phenomenon is replayed in the European comity of nations dependent, for Arendt, on a neutral Jewish interstitiality grounding and facilitat- ing exchanges among participating nation-states.
Arendt obviously con- demns slavery, and she bemoans the ironies of Jewish emancipation. Yet never does she offer conditions of emergence for a public realm that had not or would not create a caste of shadow men. And these shadow men never seem entirely to go away. It is tolerable to Arendt that the world generate maintenance labor in continuous proportion to its existence, as long as the labor does not fall exclusively to a permanent under- class of animal laborans denied participation in the world.
Even in the unjust conditions of the polis, a separation persists between the world as proud locus of the public, permanent realm and as the site— along its permanently fraying edges— of daily maintenance efforts where slaves toil in the murky zone between nature and man-made artiice.
But what to make of Jewish service to modern states, wherein a key facet of the common world actually consisted of shadow men who, at once radically indissociable from that world and alienated from it, combined the categories of world and earth outright? The medium does not, however, constitute that in-between, any more than the table constitutes the interaction of those seated around it. This is workable enough if one equates the binding medium with the inanimate objects, artworks, and institutions that Arendt envisions when she discusses the man-made world. The problem arises when men become the medium.
Consider the comity of nations mourned by Arendt. But that worldlessness had also made the world possible. This is as troubling, given the exclusion it perpetuated of the Jews from true political life, as it is paradoxical. Nations could not reasonably stake their collective equilibrium on an international Jewish solidarity that fundamentally escaped their control. Arendt never takes up the paradox, though, because it indexes an aporia in her thought. This worldlessness in the world, this excess haunting the system, is the superluity reassigned by Arendt from the state to empire.
The lengths Arendt goes to contain that fact relect the extent of the problem it poses for her political philosophy. So far I have discussed one such tactic on her part: the deferral achieved in transforming, via the displacement the- sis, the Jews from a constitutive superluity of the state into one of the many superluities produced by capitalist imperialism. Beyond just conveniently funneling that superluity away from the state, empire funnels it away from Europe altogether.
But this does more than redirect the problem of superluity abroad. It also presents Arendt an occasion, I will be arguing, to recoup distinctions problematically muddled for her by that superluity when it was still attached to the state. The jurist and political theorist Carl Schmitt had emerged the year before from postwar disgrace to publish The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum, his sweeping relection on the evolving fortunes of the Old World in a global context.
Still, like her contemporaries in the Frankfurt School, Arendt continued to take Schmitt seriously—if with a grain of salt. Both thinkers, too, date the decline of this Euro- pean order to the late nineteenth-century rise of high empire. Arendt sometimes appears to present the old inter-European solidar- ity as having constituted its own transcendent foundation.
But already here Arendt effects a meaningful slippage. The European balance, therefore, that Schmitt overtly anchors in the external, bracketing guarantor of the nomos, Arendt tacitly anchors in the internal, bracketing guarantor of the Jews. Again, differences remain. Where Arendt emphasizes inter-European solidarity, Schmitt stresses the generative importance of inter-European enmity.
Arendt also never countenances the right of colonial conquest that Schmitt so lustily invokes.
The reason lies in the nature of the brackets. Now, it may appear perverse to associate with the Jews a malady that would erupt full bore in the Final Solution. As I have been arguing all along, however, the real problem for Arendt of Jewish worldlessness is not that Jews had turned away from, or been turned away by, the world. Rather, it is that they igured the paradoxical indispensability of worldlessness to the world, with all the category- collapsing conse- quences implied.
That the Jews should bear this burden for Arendt is not in itself espe- cially remarkable.